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1 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Minutes of the Special Group Meeting  
of 31 January 1963

1. Present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, Mr. John McCone, Mr. Averell Harriman, Mr. Thomas Parrott, Col. Ralph Steakley, and Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.

2. [redacted]

a) Mr. McCone stated the history leading to the development of USIB requirements for U-2 coverage of [redacted] including a discussion of the exhaustive attempt on the part of COMOR and the community to investigate other sources of intelligence which might be used to get the desired information. He pointed out that the Soviets had supplied very large quantities of military material and that the intelligence community believed it was essential that they have information on the possible inclusion of offensive missiles in this deployment.

b) Mr. Johnson said he was very worried about the political repercussions of these flights since he felt that the U-2's would be identified and the U. S. blamed for this activity. The use [redacted] would have no effect except in the event of an incident. He felt that from a political point of view this was not timely and that these flights would be far better at a time when [redacted] had been involved in some aggressive act. Mr. Bundy and Special Ambassador Harriman generally concurred in these views. Mr. McCone pointed out that the very fact that the Soviets had poured in more than \$500 million worth of military supplies was an act which warranted our taking action to determine

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NRO review(s) completed.

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the nature of the threat, particularly in view of our experiences in Cuba. Mr. Johnson et al did not believe that the situation was the same since [redacted] was not a direct threat to the U. S. I pointed out that while the timing on getting the intelligence might not be critical, the deployment of SAMS made it very desirable to obtain this coverage prior to their having reached operational status in order to keep the risks down.

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c) I pointed out that we would probably need a minimum of a month before the actual operation could be carried out since it was necessary to pull the aircraft back from [redacted] and regroup before deployment to [redacted]. Time would also be required to get official approval from [redacted] and make the necessary arrangements for supporting the operation at the new base in [redacted]. It was suggested by Ambassador Harriman that one might obtain contingency approval from [redacted] so that perhaps some time might be saved were it desired to mount the operation at a more opportune time. Mr. McCone pointed out the difficulties of such an approach to [redacted] and said he was not much enchanted with the idea since probably [redacted] reaction would be to come back when you have made up your mind. Mr. Bundy, however, felt there would be no harm in trying this approach. It was agreed, with Mr. McCone dissenting, that the operation would not be approved at this time and that we would make a contingency approach to [redacted]. Mr. McCone indicated that he would refer the matter back to USIB since this was a USIB requirement and then decide whether he would raise the matter with the President.

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3. U-2 Operations in [redacted] Ambassador Young's cable was discussed briefly and dismissed since no one expressed any concern vis-a-vis the political problems of having the U-2 operating out of [redacted]

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4. [redacted] U-2 Base. Mr. McCone raised the question about the desirability of taking steps to establish [redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted]

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base for the U-2 operations. He pointed out that if this were to be a permanent base, the cost might be high, but I pointed out that such a base would be required for protracted operations out [redacted] to support a continuing hot situation on the border and particularly if one wished eventually to develop a clandestine capability for coverage of [redacted]. Mr. Johnson was in favor of approaching [redacted] on such a base if it made operational sense, and it was agreed that CIA would take steps to initiate exploratory discussions with [redacted] without making any firm commitments. (DD/R to initiate action).

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During the course of the discussion Mr. McCone pointed out that we were proposing to bring back the U-2 presently stationed at [redacted] for IRAN as soon as presently approved North Viet-Nam coverage had been obtained and final look had been had of the Sino-Indian border coverage to be sure we had the desired coverage. When recoverage was required, this would be done either at [redacted] base, depending on the results of the discussions and an analysis of the problems involved, or back at [redacted] again.

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. 5. JCS Monthly Forecast.


a) [redacted] Mr. Johnson raised the question of the destroyer patrol in Indonesian waters, and it was agreed that this should be carried out with the inclusion of an official visit to Djakarta to account for the peculiar course.

b) [redacted] There was considerable discussion of the risks and problems involved in this particular operation at a distance of 5 miles. It was finally agreed that this operation should be limited to a distance of 10 miles off shore.

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HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Deputy Director  
(Research)

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